The African meningitis belt, extending across sub-Saharan Africa from Senegal to Ethiopia, is known for meningitis seasonal hyperendemicity as well as periodic large-scale outbreaks \[[@CIT0001]\]. Before 2010, *Neisseria meningitidis* serotype A (NmA) was responsible for most epidemics, while other serogroups (W and X) also caused epidemics \[[@CIT0002], [@CIT0003]\]. Reactive vaccination of affected populations with serogroup-specific vaccines is an essential component of the meningitis outbreak control strategy \[[@CIT0003]\]. The development of a meningococcal serogroup A conjugate vaccine (MenAfriVac, MACV) for Africa enabled the integration of preventive vaccination into the control strategy. Since the progressive introduction of MACV in 21 meningitis belt countries (2010--2017), NmA cases have been reduced dramatically and epidemics have been successfully eliminated from the region \[[@CIT0004], [@CIT0005]\]. A study conducted in 9 countries that carried out mass campaigns with MACV (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo) found a 58% decline in incidence of suspected meningitis, a \>99% decline in incidence of confirmed NmA meningitis, a 59% decline in risk of epidemics, and an increase in incidence of non-NmA meningitis (incidence rate ratio 2.76; confidence interval, 1.21--6.30) \[[@CIT0006]\].

Outbreaks due to non-NmA serogroups are still reported in the region, necessitating continuing outbreak response measures, particularly reactive vaccination \[[@CIT0005]\]. Since its establishment in 1997, the International Coordinating Group (ICG) on vaccine provision for epidemic meningitis control has managed an emergency vaccine stockpile to sustain country access to emergency vaccines \[[@CIT0007]\]. However, the provision of vaccine covering non-NmA serogroups is increasingly limited, as manufacturers have started phasing out the production of polysaccharide vaccines, the main vaccines used for outbreak response in Africa \[[@CIT0005], [@CIT0008]\], and privileging the production of the more effective but costly conjugate vaccines.

We present here a description and analysis of *N. meningitidis* epidemics that have occurred after MACV introduction through 2017, including an analysis of the reactive vaccination.

MATERIAL AND METHODS {#s1}
====================

Definitions {#s2}
-----------

World Health Organization (WHO) definitions for cases and outbreaks were used in this analysis, as shown in [Table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}. The epidemic season was defined as the period between weeks 1 and 26, from 1 January of each year.

###### 

Case and Outbreak Definitions

  Category                    Definition
  --------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Suspected meningitis case   Any person with sudden onset of fever (\>38.5°C rectal or 38.0°C axillary) and 1 of the following signs: neck stiffness, flaccid neck (infants), bulging fontanelle (infants), convulsion or other meningeal signs \[[@CIT0009], [@CIT0010]\].
  Confirmed meningitis case   Any person with meningeal signs and identification of a causal pathogen (*Neisseria meningitidis*, *Streptococcus pneumoniae*, *Haemophilus influenzae* type b) in the cerebrospinal fluid by culture, polymerase chain reaction, or rapid diagnostic test \[[@CIT0009], [@CIT0010]\].
  Alert threshold             An attack rate of 3 suspected cases per 100 000 inhabitants per week in a district or subdistrict with populations \>30 000 or, in populations \<30 000, 2 cases in 1 week or a higher incidence than in a nonepidemic year \[[@CIT0009]\]. Crossing this threshold triggers the reinforcement of surveillance.
  Epidemic threshold          An attack rate of 10 suspected cases/100 000 inhabitants in 1 week in a district or subdistrict with populations \>30 000 or, in populations \<30 000, 5 cases in 1 week or a doubling of incidence in a 3-week period. In special situations with high transmission risk (eg, mass gatherings, refugee camps, displaced persons, or closed institutions), 2 confirmed cases within 1 week are considered an epidemic \[[@CIT0009]\].
  Outbreak                    Defined operationally as a situation in which the epidemic threshold has been crossed, triggering response actions: the launch of vaccination campaigns and the use of a specific antibiotic treatment protocol.

Data Collection and Analysis {#s3}
----------------------------

The WHO enhanced meningitis surveillance (ES) network was established across the African meningitis belt in 2003, initially in 8 countries \[[@CIT0002]\]. Standard methods were developed to detect and notify cases, including standard operating procedures, standard case definitions, intervention thresholds (see [Table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}), laboratory standards, and data collection tools. From 2011 to 2017, the number of countries participating in the ES network increased from 13 to 24 \[[@CIT0011]\].We reviewed data reported to the WHO ES regional network after MACV introduction in the 21 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo and Uganda) that had completed mass campaigns. We excluded data from the Democratic Republic of Congo as the majority of the country is considered to be outside the meningitis belt and therefore the intervention thresholds are not considered applicable \[[@CIT0005], [@CIT0011]\]. National-level data included numbers of suspected cases and deaths, laboratory confirmation (by polymerase chain reaction, culture, and agglutination) of cases, and number of epidemic districts. Case fatality ratios (CFR) were calculated using all the reported suspected cases as denominator. The data used to describe the outbreaks included the aggregate, weekly, district-level data from the ES regional database, as well as individual outbreak reports and applications for vaccines from the ICG emergency vaccine stockpile. We also used anonymized line list data, which included more detailed district-level laboratory confirmation data when this was available, as was the case in Ghana 2016, Niger 2015--2017, and Nigeria 2017. To calculate attack rates per 100 000, we used the official district-level population sizes as reported by each country to WHO, which are updated annually.

Districts reaching the epidemic threshold in 1 country were grouped as a single outbreak when time and place converged. An outbreak was attributed to 1 serogroup, defined as the serogroup reported in \>50% of confirmed cases. When the proportion of another serogroup was sizable (≥30%) this was indicated. We did not consider pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks in this analysis. Molecular analyses, conducted by the WHO Collaborating Centers for Meningitis, on a limited number of cerebrospinal fluid samples/isolates, allowed genotypic characterization of outbreak strains.

Vaccination data (administrative coverage, response timelines, and number of vaccinated individuals) were obtained from the ICG vaccine request database and vaccination reports. Reporting of epidemic areas was done at district level, as per the ES data reporting. However, reactive vaccination sometimes targeted populations at the subdistrict level, resulting in partial vaccination of districts.

We estimated the timeliness of response, defined as the time between the date of crossing the epidemic threshold (last day of the epidemiological week when the threshold was crossed) and the date when the reactive vaccination campaign was started. We further characterized this timeline as: (1) the delay between crossing of the epidemic threshold and the date when the ICG vaccine request was approved (as a proxy for the time needed to properly document an outbreak and decide on response); and (2) vaccination delay between vaccine request approval and the start of vaccination (ie, the time taken for vaccine deployment and campaign preparation).

RESULTS {#s4}
=======

Epidemiological Description {#s5}
---------------------------

Between 2011 and 2017, a total of 17 outbreaks were reported from countries that had introduced MACV. These occurred in 8 countries and affected 113 districts, for a total number of 31 786 suspected cases (yearly range from 129 in 2011 to 16 547 in 2017; [Table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). From 2011 to 2014, only 1 outbreak was reported per year, while from 2015 to 2017, 3 to 6 outbreaks per year were reported. All of them were reported during the epidemic season except for 1 outbreak in a refugee camp in Ethiopia (weeks 40 to 50). The most affected country was Nigeria, which reported 5 outbreaks with a total of 17 375 suspected cases and 55 epidemic districts, followed by Niger, which reported 4 outbreaks (9343 cases, 21 epidemic districts). Burkina Faso was affected by a large outbreak in 2012 (2372 cases, 13 epidemic districts) but did not report outbreaks subsequently. Togo was affected by 1 large outbreak in 2016 \[[@CIT0012]\] and 2 in 2017 (1812 cases and 11 epidemic districts in total). Benin, Cameroun, Ethiopia, and Ghana reported 1 outbreak each during this period. Outbreaks ranged in size from 18 cases (refugee camp outbreak, Ethiopia 2015) to 14 542 cases (Nigeria, 2017), with a median of 467 suspected cases, and affected between 1 and 37 districts (median 3). Two outbreaks were considered as special situations, where 2 confirmed cases in a week constituted an epidemic: 1 was reported in an Ethiopian refugee camp in 2015 and the other in a Cameroonian prison in 2017. The number of cases, 18 and 25 respectively, were the lowest among all outbreaks, with CFR of 0% and 32%. Average CFR for all outbreaks, excluding these 2 special situations, was 6% (range 2%--11%). The number of cases reported during the 17 outbreaks represented 45% of the total number of cases (week 1 to 26) reported after MACV introduction, ranging from 3% in 2011 to 83% in 2017.

###### 

Description of Meningococcal Meningitis Outbreaks in the Meningitis Belt, 2011--2017

  Year    Country    Number of Epidemic Districts   Predominant Pathogen   Clonal Complex   Number of Cases per Outbreak   Number of Confirmed Cases per Outbreak   Proportion of Confirmed Outbreak Cases (%)   Number of Deaths per Outbreak   Case Fatality Ratio (%)   Cumulative AR, Average (Range)   Number of Years After MACV Mass Campaigns
  ------- ---------- ------------------------------ ---------------------- ---------------- ------------------------------ ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- ------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------------------
  2011    Niger      1                              NmW                    ST-11            129                            66                                       51                                           13                              10                        43 (NA)                          1
  2012    Burkina    13                             NmW                    ST-11            2372                           532                                      22                                           219                             9                         85 (59--111)                     2
  2013    Nigeria    3                              NmC                    ST-10217         329                            7                                        2                                            13                              4                         67 (46--87)                      1
  2014    Nigeria    6                              NmC                    ST-10217         467                            10                                       2                                            50                              11                        100 (12--261)                    2
  2015    Ethiopia   1                              NmC                    ST-103           18                             6                                        33                                           0                               0                         NA                               2
  2015    Niger      13                             NmC                    ST-10217         6775                           1456                                     21                                           489                             7                         203 (27--992)                    5
  2015    Nigeria    8                              NmC                    ST-10217         1854                           20                                       1                                            80                              4                         186 (29--1037)                   3
  2016    Ghana      10                             NmW                    NAV              763                            138                                      18                                           49                              6                         97 (31--195)                     4
  2016    Niger      3                              NmC                    ST-10217         760                            150                                      20                                           23                              3                         83 (39--116)                     6
  2016    Nigeria    1                              NmC                    ST-10217         183                            35                                       19                                           7                               4                         183 NA                           4
  2016    Togo       9                              NmW                    ST-11            1589                           346                                      22                                           83                              5                         142 (70--233)                    1
  2017    Benin      1                              NmC                    NAV              78                             11                                       14                                           6                               8                         189 NA                           5
  2017    Cameroun   1                              NmC                    ST-175           25                             5                                        20                                           8                               32                        NA                               5
  2017    Niger      4                              NmC                    ST-10217         1679                           428                                      25                                           76                              5                         112 (62--198)                    7
  2017    Nigeria    37                             NmC                    ST-10217         14 542                         563                                      4                                            1163                            8                         131 (27--666)                    5
  2017    Togo       1                              NmW                    ST-11            100                            22                                       22                                           5                               5                         138 (NA)                         2
  2017    Togo       1                              NmW                    ST-11            123                            34                                       28                                           3                               2                         37 (NA)                          2
  Total              113                                                                    31 786                         3815                                     20^a^                                        2287                            6^b^                      119.7                            

Abbreviations: AR, attack rate; NA, not applicable; NAV, not available; NmA, NmC, NmW, and NmY, *Neisseria meningitidis* serogroups.

^a^Median.

^b^Average excluding Cameroon and Ethiopia (special situations outbreaks).

NmC was identified as the predominant pathogen in 11 of the 17 outbreaks (Benin, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Niger, and Nigeria), where a total of 78 epidemic districts and 26 710 cases were reported. NmW was the predominant pathogen in 6 outbreaks (Niger 2011, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo) in a total of 35 districts and with 4935 cases. Notably, there were no NmA outbreaks reported. NmX was not predominant in any of the outbreaks, but its proportion was sizable in 1 outbreak, in Togo in 2017, where it represented 37% of the *N. meningitidis* cases identified.

The average district cumulative attack rate per outbreak was 120 cases/100 000, ranging from 37/100 000 population (Togo 2017, 1 district) to 203/100 000 (Niger 2015, 13 districts). Cumulative attack rates per district were as high as 1037 cases/100 000 population (Aliero, Nigeria, 2015). The average district cumulative attack rate was higher for NmC outbreaks (139 cases/100 000 population/year, 9 outbreaks, 76 epidemic districts) than for NmW outbreaks (90 cases/100 000 population/year, 6 outbreaks, 35 epidemic districts; [Figure 1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). The 2 special situation outbreaks were excluded from this comparison.

![Cumulative attack rates per outbreak (district average), stratified by serogroup, excluding special situations outbreaks in Cameroon and Ethiopia. *Neisseria meningitidis* serogroup C outbreaks are shown in blue and *N. meningitidis* W outbreaks in green. Red line indicates epidemic criterion. Abbreviations: AR, attack rate; BEN, Benin; BF, Burkina Faso; GHA, Ghana; NE, Niger; NG, Nigeria; TOG, Togo.](jiz355f0001){#F1}

The median proportion of suspected cases that were laboratory confirmed per outbreak was 20% (range 1% Nigeria 2015 to 51% Niger 2011). For the 3 largest outbreaks (\>2000 cases: Nigeria 2017, Niger 2015, and Burkina 2012) these proportions were 4%, 17%, and 22%, respectively.

Molecular Analyses {#s6}
------------------

Molecular analyses of outbreak strains led to the identification of the emergence of a highly epidemic NmC strain, sequence type (ST)-10217. This strain was responsible for the large-scale NmC outbreaks in Niger and Nigeria \[[@CIT0013]\]. The small NmC outbreaks in Ethiopia and Cameroun were caused by 2 different STs (ST-11592 and ST-2881, respectively) belonging to clonal complexes unrelated to ST-10217 ([Table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). The NmW strains responsible for the epidemics during the study period belonged to clonal complex ST-11, which has been circulating in the meningitis belt since 2000 \[[@CIT0014]\]. No molecular information was available for the Benin and Ghana outbreaks.

Epidemic Response {#s7}
-----------------

A reactive vaccination campaign was organized to respond to 14 (78%) of the outbreaks and in 74% of the epidemic districts (84/113), as well as in 30 other affected districts (subdistrict vaccination), with a total of 5 724 603 people being vaccinated. The administrative vaccination coverage rate achieved ranged from 66% to 107% (median 87%; [Table 3](#T3){ref-type="table"}). Vaccination was conducted in a median of 5.5 districts per outbreak (range 1 to 35) and 408 900 people were vaccinated per outbreak (range 6720 in Cameroun in 2017 to 2 008 400 in Nigeria in 2017). In all outbreaks where reactive vaccination was conducted, a polysaccharide (ACW or ACYW) vaccine was used, covering 4.7 million people. For 2 of the outbreaks, a conjugate vaccine was used in 10 of the affected districts (ACYW conjugate vaccine in 1 of 15 districts vaccinated in Niger 2015 and monovalent C conjugate in 9 of 35 districts vaccinated in Nigeria 2017), covering 982 150 people ([Table 3](#T3){ref-type="table"}). As this was the first time these vaccines had been used for outbreak response in Africa, and to maximize potential impact (eg, herd protection) and for monitoring purposes, conjugate vaccines were used under specific conditions (vaccination of whole districts, distribution of vaccination cards, coverage survey, and strengthened monitoring).

###### 

Reactive Vaccination Campaign Uptake and Vaccine Used During 2011--2017 Meningococcal Outbreaks

  Year    Country    Number of Districts Vaccinated   Type of Vaccine Used         Vaccination Coverage (%)   Number of People Vaccinated
  ------- ---------- -------------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------------------- -----------------------------
  2011    Niger      1                                PS ACW                       75                         94 286
  2012    Burkina    3                                PS ACYW                      107                        284 218
  2015    Ethiopia   2                                PS ACW                       83                         90 251
  2015    Niger      15                               PS ACW, PS ACYW, Conj ACYW   74                         1 200 352
  2015    Nigeria    17                               PS ACYW                      66                         340 538
  2016    Ghana      3                                PS ACW                       100                        139 700
  2016    Togo       9                                PS ACYW                      99                         553 288
  2016    Niger      8                                PS AC                        83                         206 755
  2016    Nigeria    9                                PS AC                        87                         171 492
  2017    Nigeria    35                               PS ACYW; PS AC; Conj C       86                         2 008 400
  2017    Niger      9                                PS AC                        86                         470 837
  2017    Togo       1                                PS ACYW                      99                         50 559
  2017    Cameroun   1                                PS ACYW                      93                         6720
  2017    Togo       1                                PS ACW                       99                         107 207
  Total              114                                                                                      5 724 603

Abbreviations: A, C, W, and Y, *Neisseria meningitidis* serogroups; Conj, conjugate; PS, polysaccharide.

The time lag to start the vaccination ranged from 10 to 64 days (median 36 days) ([Table 4](#T4){ref-type="table"}). In 6 out of 13 of the outbreaks the response delay was within 4 weeks of crossing the epidemic threshold. The investigation delay ranged from 5 to 33 days and was estimated at 51% of the total delay, while the vaccination delay ranged from 10 to 31 days (49% of the delay).

###### 

Timeliness of Reactive Vaccination

  Year                                    Country        No. of Districts Vaccinated   Investigation Delay, Average, Days^a^   Vaccination Delay, Average, Days^b^   Response Delay, Average, days^c^
  --------------------------------------- -------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- ------------------------------------- ----------------------------------
  2011                                    Niger          1                             30                                      NA                                    10
  2012                                    Burkina Faso   3                             NA                                      24                                    NA
  2015                                    Ethiopia       2                             33                                      31                                    64
  2015                                    Niger          12                            15                                      13                                    28
  2015                                    Nigeria        8                             16                                      23                                    38
  2016                                    Ghana          3                             22                                      14                                    36
  2016                                    Togo           9                             8                                       19                                    27
  2016                                    Niger          3                             28                                      25                                    53
  2016                                    Nigeria        7                             33                                      NA                                    25
  2017                                    Nigeria        28                            28                                      19                                    46
  2017                                    Niger          4                             22                                      15                                    38
  2017                                    Togo           1                             18                                      20                                    38
  2017                                    Cameroun       1                             10                                      10                                    20
  2017                                    Togo           1                             5                                       20                                    25
  Total No. districts and median delays                  83                            22.0                                    19.5                                  36.0

For Burkina Faso, investigation and response delays were not applicable as the districts vaccinated were not included in the initial request and for the response delay. Vaccination delay was not applicable (for the 2 cases ) when vaccination in the targeted districs was initiated with national stockpiles before arrival of vaccines from ICG.

Abbreviation: NA, not applicable.

^a^Number of days between epidemic threshold crossing and International Coordinating Group (ICG) request approval.

^b^Number of days between ICG request approval and start of vaccination.

^c^Number of days between epidemic threshold crossing and start of vaccination.

DISCUSSION {#s8}
==========

Our review shows that meningococcal outbreaks of large magnitude continue to occur in the countries of the African meningitis belt after introduction of MACV. While NmA outbreaks have disappeared, and the overall risk of epidemics has substantially declined \[[@CIT0006], [@CIT0015]\], non-NmA outbreaks continue to affect the region, frequently with high attack rates. Ten of the 15 outbreaks (excluding the 2 outbreaks in special situations) described in this analysis met the 100 cases/100 000 population seasonal cumulative incidence, which has been previously used to define meningitis belt epidemics \[[@CIT0016], [@CIT0017]\]. Seven of the 10 higher incidence outbreaks were caused by the new NmC strain, ST-10217. This strain caused large-scale outbreaks affecting more districts per outbreak and higher incidence rates than the NmW outbreaks during the same period. Yearly incidence reached 1000 cases/100 000 population in 2 districts in Niger and Nigeria, a level comparable to the highest incidence observed in the large-scale NmA outbreak in Nigeria in 2009 (728 cases /100 000 population/year) \[[@CIT0018]\]. Nonetheless, NmW also caused large-scale outbreaks with high incidence rates (15 districts with yearly incidence ≥100 cases /100 000 population). NmX was detected in only 1 outbreak, but it has caused major outbreaks in the past \[[@CIT0019], [@CIT0020]\], and was detected increasingly in 2017 and 2018 \[[@CIT0021], [@CIT0022]\]. This requires close monitoring, especially given the lack of a vaccine to cover this serogroup.

Average CFRs in our review were within the range of those found in NmA epidemics in the region, which oscillated around 10% \[[@CIT0023]\] and were as low as 4% in the Nigeria 2009 outbreak \[[@CIT0024]\]. It should be noted that ascertainment of meningitis deaths, and therefore estimation of CFR, is often variable and dependent on a country's surveillance system and performance \[[@CIT0025]\].

These results also point to the largely unpredictable behavior of *N. meningitidis* outbreaks \[[@CIT0026]\]. In 2018, a considerable decrease in epidemic activity was reported compared to 2017. NmC continued to cause outbreaks in Nigeria, but only in 8 districts, as well as at subdistrict level in Niger \[[@CIT0027]\]. This decrease in epidemic activity parallels that observed in 2016, following the large-scale NmC epidemic of 2015.

Our results call for continued and renewed investment in effective outbreak response. Reported reactive campaign coverage rates were globally high. However, in 3 outbreaks they were below 80%, highlighting remaining difficulties to reach populations in certain areas. Furthermore, these figures only reflect reported administrative coverage rates, as coverage surveys in reactive campaigns could not be systematically conducted. Ensuring the timeliness of reactive vaccination remains the biggest challenge for effective outbreak response. Reactive vaccination should be conducted within 4 weeks of crossing the epidemic threshold to maximize its impact \[[@CIT0017], [@CIT0028]\]. This was achieved in only 46% of the outbreaks where a response was organized. Response delays were both due to challenges in documenting and confirming the outbreak, as well as due to challenges to rapidly deploy the vaccines and organize the vaccination campaigns. Gaps in laboratory confirmation in outbreak settings are shown in this analysis. Limited and late laboratory confirmation has been highlighted as a key bottleneck in the submission of ICG vaccine requests and decision making on vaccine release \[[@CIT0029]\]. Delays in vaccine deployment and campaign planning also hampered the response. Efforts to maintain adequate vaccine stockpiles and to optimize international vaccine delivery procedures should be pursued to alleviate the delays. Limited emergency stockpiles undermined the timeliness and effectiveness of outbreak response in 2012 and 2015 \[[@CIT0030], [@CIT0031]\] and remain a serious concern. In 2017--2018, WHO and partners called for concerted action to increase global vaccine availability in the short and long term in the face of the expansion of NmC in the region and continued low vaccine stockpile levels \[[@CIT0032]\].

While the ICG emergency stockpile is mostly composed of polysaccharide vaccines, almost 1 million doses of conjugate vaccines were deployed to respond to large NmC outbreaks. This is the first time conjugate vaccines have been used for a non-A serogroup meningitis outbreak response in Africa. In contrast to polysaccharide vaccines, which are only recommended for reactive vaccination, conjugate vaccines can confer herd protection and protect infants, making them a superior control tool and extending their benefit beyond outbreak control to outbreak prevention. Given these characteristics, stockpiling conjugate vaccines should be favored despite their higher prices, as their use could be optimized by repurposing for vaccination of high-risk areas.

The epidemiological description and analyses presented in this review are mainly derived from ES data, analyzed and disseminated weekly during the meningitis season through a bulletin produced by WHO \[[@CIT0011]\]. The population-based ES, currently covering all districts from 24 countries in the region, produces reliable, essential data for decision making during outbreak response \[[@CIT0002]\]. Maintenance and strengthening of ES in all countries of the belt is recommended, accompanied by strong laboratory capacity \[[@CIT0025]\].

ES implementation can be improved, however: a few African meningitis belt countries have yet to join the ES network and some report data irregularly and incompletely, particularly laboratory results. These limitations also affected our analysis but we could not assess the completeness of ES data.

The different sensitivities and specificities of the ES country systems were described in the 2015 analysis of this network \[[@CIT0002]\]. The epidemic threshold used to detect outbreaks is based on the number of suspected cases, identified according to standard case definitions. However, ensuring the correct application of the case definition requires constant health worker training, a challenge in many countries. As the proportion of confirmed cases was only 20% and given the changing epidemiological context after MACV rollout, we cannot ascertain whether the remaining proportion of suspected cases are true bacterial meningitis cases. Nevertheless, this proportion of laboratory confirmation was considered informative enough, as per WHO standard operating procedures \[[@CIT0009], [@CIT0010]\], to guide outbreak response decision making.

The epidemic threshold is defined for populations below 100 000, but it is commonly applied and reported at district level, with populations often \>200 000 \[[@CIT0017]\]. Furthermore, district population estimates reported by countries may be underestimated, as evidenced by the vaccination coverage rates ≥100% reported in some countries. Outbreaks at subdistrict level and in hard-to-reach areas may therefore have been missed, as well as small outbreaks not meeting the standard regional definition. This was likely the case of a reported outbreak in Mali, in 2017 \[[@CIT0033]\], which was not included here as it did not cross the epidemic threshold as per ES data. Of note, the definition of outbreaks in the meningitis belt is derived from historical NmA epidemics and calculation of weekly attack rates at the district level. The applicability of this definition and outbreak thresholds was reviewed in 2014 for NmW outbreaks and was found to be adequate, except for the alert threshold, which was lowered \[[@CIT0017], [@CIT0028]\]. This was confirmed for NmC outbreaks in 2015 \[[@CIT0034]\], and was recently reevaluated and found applicable \[[@CIT0026]\].

We report on 2 special situation outbreaks, which can be considered as outliers among the list of outbreaks described. This is in consideration of both the low number of cases reported as well as to the seasonality, which is irrespective of the meningitis season. These outbreaks are defined by a particular context of high transmission risk, which is not due to the climatic conditions (seasonality) but rather to crowding. Their inclusion in this review is justified as they require special surveillance and control measures.

Our analysis confirms previous observations on the expansion and high epidemic potential of the NmC ST-10217 strain \[[@CIT0034]\]. Furthermore, molecular characterization analysis, undertaken by the WHO Collaborating Centers for Meningitis of 2011--2016 meningococcal strains in the belt, found ST-10217 to be the second most predominant strain (after ST-11), despite it being collected only from 2013 onwards \[[@CIT0014]\]. The emergence of this hyperinvasive NmC strain highlights the need for reinforced surveillance, particularly the laboratory and molecular components, which remain weak in Africa. Initiatives to strengthen case-based surveillance, reinforce laboratory capacity, and enable systematic molecular characterization of epidemic strains \[[@CIT0015], [@CIT0035]\] should be encouraged and extended.

In conclusion, despite the remarkable success of MACV introduction, *N. meningitidis* epidemics due to non-A serogroups still represent a significant burden in the region but remain largely unpredictable. Country preparedness together with timely outbreak detection and response are therefore indispensable to reduce the morbidity and mortality associated with meningococcal epidemics. At the global level, maintaining country access to an adequate supply of vaccine for response remains a high priority, until affordable multivalent (including the X serogroup) conjugate vaccines are made readily available and introduced in all at-risk countries, and particularly those of the meningitis belt \[[@CIT0036]\].
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